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The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance
and Top Management Turnover
In December 1992, the Cadbury Committee published the Code of Best Practice
which recommended that boards of publicly-traded UK corporations include at least three
outside directors and that the positions of the chairman of the board and chief executive
officer not be held by a single individual. The underlying presumption was that these
government-sponsored recommendations would lead to enhanced board oversight. As a test
of that presumption, we analyze the relation between top management ~rnover and corporate
performance. We find that CEO turnover increased following publications of the Code, that
the relationship between CEO turnover and performance was strengthened following
publication of the Code, and that the increase in the sensitivity of turnover to performance
was concentrated among firms that adopted the Cadbury Committee's recommendations.
The Cadbury Committee, Corporate Performance and Top Management Turnover
The Cadbury Committee was appointed by the Conservative Government of the
United Kingdom (UK) in May 1991 with a broad mandate to "...address the financial aspects
of corporate governance."1 In December 1992, the Committee issued its report which
recommended, among other things, that boards of directors of publicly traded companies
include at least three non-executive (i.e., outside) directors as members and that the positions
of Chairman of the Board (Chairman) and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of these companies
be held by two different individuals. The apparent reasoning underlying the Committee's
recommendations is that greater independence of a corporate board will improve the quality
of board oversight.
To appreciate the potential significance of the Cadbury Committee and its
recommendations, it is important to appreciate the environment surrounding the establishment
of the Committee. First, the Committee was appointed in the aftermath of the "scandalous"
collapse of several prominent UK companies during the later 1980s and early 1990s,
including Ferranti International PLC, Colorol Group, Pollypeck International PLC, Bank of
Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) and Maxwell Communication Corporation. The
broadsheet press popularly attributed these failures and others to weak governance systems,
lax board oversight, and the vesting of control in the hands of a single top executive.
The Cadbury Committee was set up in response to a number of corporate
scandals that cast doubt on the systems for controlling the ways companies are
I Report o/the Committee on the Financial Aspects o/Corporate Governance (Section 1.8), December I, 1992.
2run. The downfall of powerful figures such as Asil Nadir or the late Robert
Maxwell, whose personal control over their companies was complete, raised
fears about the concentration ofpower.
Self-regulation Seen as the Way Forward, Financial Times,
May 28, 1992.
Second, historically, executive (i.e., inside) directors have heavily dominated UK
boards. For example, during 1988, of the Financial Times 500, for only 21 companies did
non-executive directors comprise a majority of the board and, when boards are ranked
according to the fraction of non-executive board members, for the median board, non-
executives comprised only 27 per cent of their membership. In comparison, during 1988, for
387 of the Fortune 500 U. S. companies, outsiders comprised a majority of the board.
Furthermore, for the Fortune 500 companies, for the median board, outsiders comprised 81
per cent of the membership. With respect to the joint position of Chairman and CEO, the UK
and US historically are not dissimilar. For example, during 1988, for 349 of the Fortune 500
companies and for 328 of the FTSE 500 companies, a single individual jointly held the
positions of Chairman and CEO.
At its issuance, the Cadbury Report was greeted with skepticism both by those who
felt that it went too far and by those who felt that it did not go far enough. The general unease
of those who felt it went too far can best be summarized as a concern that the delicate balance
between shareholders and managers is best left to the forces of competition. A less generous
interpretation of this perspective, which was most frequently espoused by corporate
managers, was "leave us alone - we know best".
There is danger in an over emphasis on monitoring, on non-executive directors
independence from the business of the corporation; on controls over decision
making activities ofcompanies. When coupled with the clearly reduced status
of executives on the governing boards, such requirements must blunt the
3competitive edge and deflect the entrepreneurial drive which characterises
participants, let alone success in a free market.
.Sir Owen Green, Pall Mall Lecture on UK Corporate Governance,
February 24, 1994
The general concern of those who thought that the report did not go far enough centered on
the "voluntary" nature of the Report's recommendations.
The committees' recommendations are steps in the right direction. But, if the
government is to address the problems which led to the Maxwell, Polly Peck,
Bee! and other recent scandals, then new rules in a legal framework are
required...Shareholders, investors and creditors will have been disappointed
that just when the corporate failures of recent years cried out for bold and
imaginative legal return, the body from which so much had been expected
came up with a little, tinkering and a voluntary code.
Cadbury Committee Draft Orders Mixed News for Shareholders,
Financial Times, June 2, 1992
The purpose of this study is to cast light on what heretofore has been largely a vitriolic
dispute by investigating empirically the impact of the key Cadbury Committee
recommendations - - that boards include at least three non-executive members and that the
positions of Chairman and CEO be held by two different individuals - - on the quality of
board oversight in UK firms over the period 1989 to 1995. We begin our investigation with
the presumption that an important oversight role of boards of directors is the hiring and firing
of top corporate management. We further presume that one indicator of effective board
oversight is that the board will replace poorly performing top management. With those
presumptions in place, we empirically investigate the relationship between top management
turnover and corporate performance before and after the Cadbury Committee issued its
recommendations.
To conduct this investigation, we assemble a random sample of 460 UK companies
from the Official List of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) as of December 1988. For each
4company, we collect information on top management turnover, board composition, and
corporate performance for up to seven years before and four years after the issuance of the
Cadbury Report. With these data, we determine that the relationship between top
management turnover and corporate performance was statistically significant both before and
after adoption of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations - - poorer performance is
associated with higher turnover. Importantly, for our purposes, this relationship is
significantly stronger following adoption of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations.
Upon further exploration, the increased sensitivity of turnover to performance appears to be
attributable to the increase in outside board members following Cadbury.
We view this study as making contributions in both the small and the large of
corporate governance. From a narrow perspective, this study thoroughly examines the effect
of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations on the relationship between top management
turnover and corporate performance in the UK. From a broader perspective, this study
contains implications for corporate governance and board composition generally, and
augments studies by Agrawal and Knoeber (1994), Bhagat and Black (1996; 1998), Byrd and
Hickman (1992), Cotter, Shivdasani and Zenner (1997), Denis and Sarin (1999), Hermalin
and Weisbach (1998), Kaplan and Reishaus (1990), Kini, Kracaw and Mian (1995), Klein
(1997), Kole and Lehn (1996), Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Shivdasani (1993), Weisbach
(1988), Yermack (1996) and You, Caves, Smith and Henry (1986) among others. Our
investigation also complements prior investigations of the relationship between top
management turnover and corporate performance by Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Denis
and Denis (1995), Franks and Mayer (1997), Huson Parrino and Starks (1998), Jensen and
Murphy (1990), Kang and Shivdasani (1995), Kaplan (1994a, b), Martin and McConnell
5(1991), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) and Weisbach (1988)
among others.
The next section briefly describes the Cadbury Committee Report on the "Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance". Section II describes our sample selection procedure.
Section III presents descriptive statistics for the sample. We reserve our review of related
studies until after we present our empirical findings. In Section IV, we discuss our results in
the context of prior empirical investigations and present our conclusions.
I. Cadbury Committee Report
The Cadbury Committee was chaired by a leading industrialist, Sir Adrian Cadbury,
CEO of the Cadbury confectionery empire, and included other senior industry executives,
finance specialists, and academics. The Committee was charged with examining the
"financial aspects of corporate governance" in UK firms. The committee issued a draft report
of its recommendations for public comment on May 27, 1992. Between then and December
1, 1992, the committee accepted comments and issued its final report on December 1, 1992.
The cornerstone of the Cadbury Report is "The Code of Best Practice" which presents
the committee's recommendations on the structure and responsibilities of corporate boards of
directors. The two key recommendations affecting the board structure were that boards of
directors of publicly-traded companies include at least three outside directors as members and
that the positions of Chairman and CEO be held by two different individuals.2
2 The report also recommended: (i) full disclosure of the pay of the chairman and the highest paid director; (ii)
shareholders' approval on executive directors contracts exceeding three years; (iii) executive directors pay be set
by a board sub-committee (the remuneration committee) comprised primarily of outsiders and; (iv) directors
should establish a sub-committee of the main board, comprised mainly of outside directors. to report on the
effectiveness of the company's system of internal control. including mechanisms for risk assessment and
management.
6As part of its report, the Committee "urged" that the boards of all companies
registered on the Official List of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) comply with the Code
and further "encouraged" that all other UK companies also aim to meet its guidelines.3 As
such, compliance with "The Code of Best Practice" is entirely voluntary. That is, the Code
has not been enshrined in UK corporate law. This does not imply, however, that the Code is
"without teeth". First, the Cadbury Committee, as part of its report, explicitly recognized that
legislation would very likely follow if companies did not comply with the guidelines of the
Code.4 Second, the report has been given further bite by the LSE which, since June 1993, has
required a statement from each listed company which spells out whether the fInn is in
compliance with the Code and, if not, further requires that an explanation be given as to why
the company is not in compliance. As it turns out, this informal arm-twisting appears to have
been effective: by 1998 all companies in the Financial Times 100 and over 90% of all fIrms
on the Official List of the LSE were in compliance with the key provisions of the Code. The
question that we investigate herein is whether adoption of the key provisions of the Cadbury
Committee's recommendations has had a signifIcant impact on the relationship between
corporate performance and top management turnover.
ll. Sample Selection
Our empirical investigation focuses on top management turnover during the eight-year
interval surrounding the publication of the Cadbury Report in May 1992 (i.e., April 1988
through May 1996). Our analysis employs data on top management turnover and composition
3 Report ofthe Committee on the Financial Aspects ofCorporate Governance (Section 3.1), December 1,1992.
4 Report ofthe Committee on the Financial Aspects ofCorporate Governance (Section 1.1), December 1, 1992.
7of boards of directors along with various measures of corporate performance for a random
sample of publicly-traded UK finns. Additionally, our analysis employs certain financial data
for these firms along with descriptive data for their boards and top management.
To begin construction of our sample, we randomly selected 650 industrial firms out of
a total of 1,828 industrial finns contained in the Official List of the LSE as of year-end 1988.
For each of the 650 firms for which data are available in the Corporate Register for 1988, we
determined the names of board members, the number of outside directors, the age of the top
executive, the aggregate number of common shares held by the board, the number of shares
held by institutional investors, and the number of block shareholders, where a block
shareholder is defined as any shareholder owning greater than 3 per cent of the company's
common stock. Such data are available for 548 of the firms in the initial sample.5 Stock price
data and accounting data including the book value of total assets, total sales, the book value of
liabilities, and earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes (EBDIT) are taken from
Datastream for the years 1985 to 1988. If such data are not available for the three years 1985
through 1988, the firm is dropped from the sample. Forty-seven of the 548 firms were
dropped because of insufficient stock price data; an additional 41 firms were dropped due to
insufficient accounting data. The resulting sample contains 460 firms. These firms were then
identified according to their Financial Times (FT) industry classification. (The FT industry
classification is roughly comparable to SIC classifications in the US.) The sample includes
firms from 33 different industrial categories.
S Because of some apparent inconsistencies in share ownership data, we cross-checked these data with corporate
annual reports at Companies House, Cardiff, Wales.
.,
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To capture the characteristics of firms naturally leaving and entering the LSE
population, when a firm in our sample ceases to be listed, we search chronologically among
newly-listed industrial firms until we identify the first firm with book value of assets within
+/-20% of the book value of assets of the firm that ceased to be listed. For this firm to be
eligible to enter our sample, we further require that data be available on management identity,
board composition, share ownership, and financial performance. Finally, we require that if
the existing firm was (was not) in compliance with the Code, the replacement firm must (must
not) be in compliance. By following this procedure, a replacement firm was identified for
each firm that ceased to be listed within at most four months following the delisting of that
firm. We continue this procedure each year from 1988 onward, replacing firms that are no
longer listed on the LSE, through the end of 1996, so that the sample always contains 460
firms each year through the end of 1996.
For firms that continue in the sample, for each year, we collected the names of board
members, the number of outside directors, the age of the top executive, the aggregate number
of common shares held by the board, the number of shares held by institutional investors, and
the number of block shareholders from the Corporate Register and take stock returns and
accounting data from Datastream. When a new firm enters the sample, we gather financial
data from its year of entry onward from Datastream and descriptive data for the board and
management from the Corporate Register. Accounting data for three years prior to the LSE
listing year are taken from filings with the LSE at the time of listing. The shares of some
newly-listed firms had traded elsewhere prior to entering the LSE Official List. For these
firms, stock price data are collected for up to three years preceding their listing date. For
9other firms, for which no prior stock price data are available, we use stock price data
beginning with their entry date onto the Official List.
To determine top management turnover, we compare the names of top management
from year to year over the time period 1986 through 1996. For each company, we identify the
top executive as the individual with the title of CEO or Executive Chairman.6 In addition, we
identify other board members as members of the top management team if the board member is
an employee of the firm and holds the title of chief of operations or managing director. If the
name of the top executive changes between successive years, we classify that as turnover in
the top executive position. For other members of the top management team, if their name
disappears from the top management list, that event is deemed to be a turnover in the top
management team excluding the top executive. If the top executive leaves the list of top
management and is replaced by another member of the top team, that event is considered
turnover in the top executive position, but not turnover in the top management team (because
that individual is still with the firm). We do not count as turnover, the event in which the
position of Executive Chairman is split into the positions of Chairman of the board and CEO.
We classify turnover as "normal" or "forced" by examining news articles contained in
the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times, and Macarthy's News Information
Service. A turnover event is considered to be forced under any of the following three
circumstances: (1) a news article states that the executive was "fired"; (2) a news article
states that the executive "resigned", the executive was less than 60 years old, no other article
indicates that the executive had taken a position elsewhere, and no other article cites health,
6 In those finns in which a single individual holds the positions of Chairman and CEO; that individual carries the
title of Executive Chairman.
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family or death as the reason for the executive's departure; or (3) a news article indicates that
the company was experiencing poor performance, the executive was less than 60 years old, no
other article indicates that the executive had taken a position elsewhere, and no other article
cited health, family or death as the reason for the executive's departure. All other turnover is
considered "normal" turnover.
Neither of our turnover measures is a pristine characterization of the phenomenon that
we wish to capture. In particular, we would like to be able to identify· instances in which an
executive has departed his position involuntarily. Our first measure, i.e., all departures,
undoubtedly includes a significant number of voluntary departures. Thus, this measure will
be an overstatement of the number we would like to have. However, if the rate of voluntary
departures is constant before and after Cadbury, any differential in the rate of total turnover
will represent a change in involuntary turnover such that our total turnover measure will
capture any change in the rate of forced turnover. Even then, of course, any effect will be
estimated with noise and the significance level of the effect will be downwardly biased.
Our second measure of turnover, i.e., ''forced'' turnover, will embed a different type of
measurement error. Because our classification system is based on secondary sources, i.e.,
news accounts, any modifications in the way in which top management changes are reported
through time could give rise to misclassifications. Of course, depending upon the way in
which the practice of reporting top management turnover changed, any modification may lead
to either an over- or under-statement of forced turnover. Our hope is that by using three
sources to cross-reference turnover events, we have minimized the instances in which we
have misclassified turnover due to a change in reporting practices.
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We are interested in the relationship between top management turnover and corporate
performance. In our tests, we employ both accounting earnings and stock returns data to
measure performance. Specifically, as our measure of accounting earnings, we use 3-year
average industry-adjusted return on assets (IAROA). For each year, for each firm in the
sample, we calculate ROA as earnings before depreciation, interest and taxes (EBDIT)
divided by beginning of the year total assets. Then for each firm with the same Financial
Times Industrial Classification as the firm in our sample, we calculate ROA in the same way.
Next, each year, for each Industrial Classification group, we determine the median ROA.
IAROA is calculated by subtracting the industry median ROA from the sample firm's ROA
for each of the three years prior to a turnover event. The simple average of these three
IAROAs is in our measure of accounting performance.
As our measure of stock price performance, we calculate market model cumulative
excess returns (CERs) where market model parameters are estimated over a 280 trading-day
period beginning 30 days after the announcement of the change in management. The value-
weighted FTSE All Share Index is used as the market return. CERs are computed using daily
returns beginning 36 calendar months prior to, and ending 2 days prior to, the announcement
of the change in top management.
ID. Characteristics of the Sample
To conduct our analysis, we split management turnover along two dimensions. First,
for the full sample, we split turnover events into pre- and post-Cadbury time periods. The
pre-Cadbury time period includes all top management turnover during 1989 through 1992.
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The post-Cadbury time period includes all turnover during 1993 through 1996. Descriptive
data for these two samples are presented in the fIrst column of Table 1.
Second, we classify the observations according to whether the fInn that experienced
the turnover was (or was not) in compliance with the two key provisions of the Code. This
second classifIcation scheme gives rise to three sets of fIrms. The fIrst set includes those
fInns that were in compliance with the Code for each year that the fInn is in our sample
(hereafter, the "always-in-compliance" set, 150 finns). The second set includes those finns
that came into compliance with the Code during a year in which the finn was in our sample
(hereafter, the "adopted-Cadbury" set, 288 firms). The third set includes those fIrms that
were never in compliance with the Code during any year in which the firm was in our sample
(hereafter, the "never-in-compliance" set, 22 firms). Descriptive data for the first and third
sets are split into pre- and post-Cadbury time periods. These data are presented in columns
two and four of Table 1. Descriptive data for the second set of firms (Le., the adopted-
Cadbury set) are split into pre- and post-Cadbury adoption time periods (i.e., y-4 to y-l and
y+1 to y+4, where y equals the year in which the firm came into compliance with the Code).
These data are presented in column three of Table 1.
Panel A of Table I presents the market value of equity, total assets, and leverage for
each set of fIrms. If there is anything remarkable in these data, it is the similarity across the
various sets of firms and time periods along these dimensions. For example, the pre-Cadbury
mean book value of assets for the 3 sets of firms is £148.8m, £150.lm and £146.8m,
respectively. These data exemplify the commonality of data across the sets of firms.
Panel B presents the fraction of shares owned by each of three ownership categories:
the top executive, the board of directors including the top executive, and institutional
13
investors. The table also gives the number of block shareholders. Regardless of the category
of investor, the fraction of shares held by that category is essentially unchanged from before
to after Cadbury. On average, for the full sample, the top executive owns 1% of the stock,
aggregate board ownership is approximately 2.25%, institutional owners hold approximately
11% of the shares, and the typical firm has 2 or 3 blockholders. On these dimensions, the
always-in-compliance set and the adopted-Cadbury set are similar to the full sample and to
each other. However, the never-in-compliance set has significantly more ownership by the
top executive (roughly 5% vs. 1%), significantly greater board ownership (roughly 9% vs.
2.5%), significantly lower institutional ownership (roughly 6% vs. 11 %), and fewer
blockholders than the other two sets. Apparently, firms with greater "inside" ownership of
shares are less likely to adopt the Cadbury Code.
Panel C presents data on the composition of the board. Not surprisingly, there is
considerable variation before and after Cadbury and across the various sets of firms. For the
full set of firms, prior to Cadbury, the Chairman of the Board also held the position of top
manager in 36.5% of the companies; after Cadbury, that fraction drops to 15.4%. Of course,
most of this change is due to the set of companies that came into compliance with the Code
during the period of our study. For this set, prior to Cadbury, in 39% of the finns, a single
individual held the position of Chairman and CEO; after adoption of Cadbury, of course, in
none of these companies did a single individual hold both positions.
As regards, outside directors, for the full sample, prior to Cadbury, 35.3% of directors
were outsiders; after Cadbury, the figure increased to 46.0%. Almost all of this increase
occurred among companies that came into compliance with the Code during the period of our
study. For this set of firms, the fraction of outsiders increased from 26.1 % before adoption of
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Cadbury to 46.6%, afterward. For the always-in-compliance set, the percentage of outside
directors prior to Cadbury, 48.6% was nearly identical to the percentage afterward, 48.5%.
Finally, according to Panel C, most of the increase in outside directors came about by
means of increasing the board size as opposed to replacing inside directors with outsiders.
The median board increased by two members, from 5 to 7 directors, and most of this increase
occurred among the adopted-Cadbury set of companies.
IV. Management Turnover
What is clear from our analysis thus far is that the Cadbury Committee's
recommendations had considerable impact on the size and composition of boards of directors,
and on the number of firms in which one individual holds the titles of Chainnan and CEO.
The question to which we now turn is - - what impact, if any, have these changes had on top
management turnover?
A. Incidence and Rate of Top Management Turnover
Panel A of Table II presents the incidence and rates of turnover in the top executive
for the full sample, the always-in-compliance set, the adopted-Cadbury set, and the never-in-
compliance set. For the full sample, the always-in-compliance set, and the never-in-
compliance set, the turnover statistics are split into two four-year periods: a pre-Cadbury
period (1989 through 1992) and a post-Cadbury period (1993 through 1996). For the
adopted-Cadbury set, the turnover statistics are split into two four-year periods surrounding
the year in which the finn came into compliance with the key provisions of the Code. The
incidence of turnover is the number of instances in which we identified a change in the top
executive. The rate of turnover is an annualized rate calculated as the incidence of turnover
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divided by the sample size divided by four years. The first two rows of Panel A present data
on all turnover in the top executive and the second two rows present data on forced turnover
in the top executive. Panel B parallels Panel A, except that Panel B contains the incidence
and rates of turnover for the top management team excluding the top executive.
The incidence (and rate) of turnover in the top executive increased significantly from
before to after Cadbury. This increase in turnover is due to an increase in what we have
classified as forced turnover. For example, for the full sample, the "rate of top executive
turnover increased by 1.23% (i.e., from 6.48% to 7.71 %), and the rate of forced turnover
increased by 1.20% (i.e., from 3.10% to 4.30%). Furthermore, the increase in turnover in the
top executive is concentrated in the adopted-Cadbury set of firms. For this set of firms, the
rate of top executive turnover increased by 1.57% (i.e., from 7.24% to 8.87%), and the rate of
forced turnover increased by 2.27% (i.e., 2.71 % to 4.98%). For the always-in-compliance set,
the rate of turnover and the rate of forced turnover is essentially unchanged from before to
after Cadbury. For the never-in-compliance set, the rate of turnover declined modestly from
before to after Cadbury, however, given the small sample size, we are inclined not to place
too much weight to this result. Thus, the increase in turnover of the top executive following
Cadbury is primarily attributable to those firms that adopted the key provisions of the Code of
Best Practice.
From Panel B, for the full sample of firms, for the top management team excluding the
top executive, the rate and incidence of all turnover increased from before to after Cadbury,
albeit the increase is not statistically significant according to conventional standards
(p-value =0.15). However, for the adopted-Cadbury set, the incidence and rate of turnover is
statistically significant. For this set of firms, the rate of turnover in the top team excluding the
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top executive increased by 1.27% (i.e., from 4.34% to 5.61 %). For the always-in-compliance
and never~in-compliance sets of firms, the rate of turnover in the top team is essentially
unchanged.
The picture that emerges from forced turnover in the top management team excluding
the top executive is less clear-cut. For the full sample, the incidence and rate of forced
turnover increases by statistically significant magnitudes from before to after Cadbury.
Furthermore, the incidence and rate of forced turnover increased for the adopted-Cadbury set
from before to after Cadbury and the increase is close to significant at conventional levels (p-
value = 0.12). The fly in the ointment resides in the always-in-compliance set. For this set of
firms, which were already in compliance, the incidence and rate of forced turnover does
increase by a statistically significant margin. Presumably that increase cannot be attributed to
the Cadbury Committee's recommendations.
Turnover data for the top executive are consistent with an argument that the Cadbury
Committees' recommendations have increased the quality of board oversight. That is,
turnover, especially forced turnover, in the top executive position has increased and that
increase is concentrated in the set of firms that adopted the key provisions of the Code of Best
Practice. The apparent clear-cut connection between top executive turnover and the Cadbury
Committee's recommendations is less clear-cut for other members of the top executive team.
The attenuation of that connection could be due to either of two phenomena: Either increased
board oversight following Cadbury focused on the top executive or the reporting of turnover
for second-tier managers is not as thorough as that for the top executive.
Of course, it could be that the increased management turnover that we have
documented following Cadbury is random across firms. The pertinent issue for our purposes
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is whether turnover is correlated with corporate performance. That is, are the "right"
managers being replaced? That is the question to which we now tum.
B. Relationship between Top Management Turnover and Corporate Performance
Table III presents a fIrst-pass look at the connection between turnover in the top
executive position and corporate performance. The presentation in Table III follows the
classifIcation scheme used in Table II in that firms are classified according to their Cadbury
adoption status and observations are classified according to whether they are pre- or post-
Cadbury. The additional dimension provided by Table III is the firms' relative performance
where performance is measured as three-year average IAROA or three-year CER as described
in Section II. For example, to construct Panel A, for each calendar year, firms are ranked
from lowest to highest on the basis of their prior three-year average IAROA. For each year,
observations are then sorted into quartiles with quartile 1 containing the 115 firms with the
lowest IAROA and quartile 4 containing the 115 firms with highest IAROA. Panel B
parallels Panel A except that Panel B includes only forced turnover. Panels C and D parallel
Panels A and B except that in Panels C and D performance is based on three-year prior CER.
Regardless of whether we consider all turnover or forced turnover, regardless of the
performance measure used, and regardless of which set of firms we consider, the incidence
and rate of turnover increases as we move from the best to the poorest performing firms both
before and after Cadbury. That is, turnover of the top executive is concentrated in the poorest
performing firms both before and after Cadbury. To the extent that there is any difference
across the panels, it is that forced turnover is especially concentrated in the poorest
performing quartiles.
The data also hint that the increase in top executive turnover from before to after
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Cadbury that we documented in Table IT is due to an increase in turnover in the lowest two
performance quartiles in the adopted-Cadbury set of firms. For example, for this set of firms
in Panel A, the rate of turnover in Quartiles 1 and 2 increased by 6.6% (Le., from 9.0% to
15.6%) and 2.8% (i.e., from 7.6% to 10.4%) respectively from before to after adoption of
Cadbury. Both of these increases have p-values less than 0.05. In comparison, for the
always-in-compliance set, in the same bottom two quartiles, the rate of turnover is essentially
unchanged from before to after Cadbury.
The data for turnover in the top management team excluding the top executive (not
shown in a table) generally show any increase in the incidence and rate of turnover as we
move from the best to the poorest performing firms, however, the relationship is not as linear
as shown in Table ITI for top executives.7 For example, in the top two IAROA quartiles of the
full sample of firms for forced turnover, the rate of turnover in the top team excluding the top
executive is 1.0%. For the bottom two quartiles, the rate of forced turnover is 5.1%.
However, the rate of turnover increases slightly from 4.25% to 6.1 % as we move from the
quartile 1 to quartile 2.
C. Multivariate Analysis of the Relationship between Top Management Turnover and
Corporate Performance
The final questions, to which we now tum, are whether the relationship between
turnover and performance is statistically significant and whether the sensitivity of turnover to
performance is greater following Cadbury. To answer that question and to control for other
factors that may influence managerial turnover, we estimate logit regressions. Initially, we
estimate regressions for the top executive in which the dependent variable is 1 if a firm
7 These data in tabular form are available from the authors upon request.
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experiences turnover in the top executive during a calendar year and zero otherwise. We
estimate separate regressions for all turnover and for forced turnover. We estimate separate
regressions using three-year prior IAROA and three-year CER as our perfonnance measures.
We include four control variables in each regression: fraction of shares owned by directors,
fraction of shares owned by institutional investors, number of block shareholders, and log of
total assets. (Subsequently, we estimate the same regressions for turnover in the top team
excluding the top executive.)
The results of our regressions for the top executive are presented in Tables IV and V.
In Table IV, the perfonnance variable is IAROA. In Table V, the perfonnance variable is
CER. Panel A of each table presents regressions with all top executive turnover as the
dependent variable and Panel B presents regressions with forced turnover as the dependent
variable. Each panel contains five regressions. Each regression includes either IAROA or
CER as an independent variable. In each regression, the coefficient of that variable is
negative and, with one exception, each has a p-value of less than 0.05. Thus, top executive
turnover is significantly negatively correlated with corporate perfonnance: the poorer the
finn's perfonnance, the greater the likelihood that the top executive will depart his position.
Of the four control variables, only the fraction of shares owned by directors regularly
has a p-value less than 0.10. The coefficient of this variable is always negative which
indicates that after controlling for perfonnance, increased share ownership by the board
reduces the likelihood that the top executive will depart his position.
We now tum to the effect of Cadbury on top executive turnover and the effect of
Cadbury on the relationship between top executive turnover and corporate perfonnance. To
begin, the first regression in each panel is estimated for the full sample of finns and includes
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an indicator variable (Dum for 1993-96) which takes a value of 0 for all observations before
January 1993 (the pre-Cadbury period) and a value of 1 for all observations after that date
(the post-Cadbury period). In each regression, the coefficient of the indicator variable Dum
for 1993-96 is positive with p-values ranging from 0.03 to 0.11. Thus, even after controlling
for corporate performance, turnover is higher in the post-Cadbury period. However, as we
noted in Table III, increased turnover appears to be attributable to the set of firms that came
into compliance with the Cadbury Committees' recommendations (the- adopted-Cadbury set)
as opposed to those firms that were always in compliance with Cadbury.
To determine whether the Cadbury/turnover relationship is due to a general
phenomenon affecting all firms or whether it is due specifically to a change in board
structures traceable to the Cadbury recommendations, we estimate the regression separately
for the always-in-compliance set of firms and for the adopted-Cadbury set. The only
difference in the regressions is that for the adopted-Cadbury set, the indicator variable (Dum
for Adopt) takes on a value of 0 in all years prior to the year in which the firm came into
compliance with the Code of Best Practice and a value of 1 for all subsequent years. These
are the second and third regressions in each panel.
For the always-in-compliance set, the coefficient of the Cadbury Dummy variable
(Dum for Adopt) is always positive, but the p-values range from 0.79 to 0.92. Thus,
introduction of the Cadbury Report had a trivial impact, if any, on the rate of turnover among
top executives in firms that were already in compliance with the key provisions of the Code.
For the adopted-Cadbury set, the coefficient of the indicator variable Dum for Adopt is
always positive with p-values ranging from 0.06 to 0.09. Additionally, the magnitude of the
coefficient is 10 times the magnitude of the coefficient of the Cadbury Dummy (Dum for
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1993-96) for the always-in-compliance set. Thus, the publication of the Code of Best Practice
did not have an impact, per se, on the rate of turnover among top UK executives; rather the
effect was concentrated among those fIrms that altered their board structures to comply with
the Code. This is not to say that the rate of turnover among top executives in fIrms that were
always-in-compliance was "too low" either before or after Cadbury. The data only show that
the rate of turnover for these fIrms did not change between the pre- and post-Cadbury periods.
In comparison, the rate of turnover increased significantly among ·firms that came into
compliance with the Cadbury recommendations during the period of this study.
To determine whether the increase in turnover is correlated with performance, we
estimate a regression with the adopted-Cadbury set of fIrms that includes the Adopted
Cadbury Dummy (Dum for Adopt) and the Adopted Cadbury Dummy interacted with our
measures of performance (either lAROA or CER) along with our measures of performance
(Dum for Adopt x Perform) and our four control variables. These are the key regressions of
our analysis and are reported as the fourth regression in each panel.
The coefficient of the interaction variable will indicate whether the increase in
turnover among fIrms that adopted Cadbury is randomly distributed across those fIrms or is
concentrated among the poorest performing fIrms. In each regression, the coefficient of the
interaction variable is negative with p-values ranging from 0.02 to 0.08. Additionally, the
coefficient of the Adopted Cadbury Dummy (Dum-for-Adopt) is reduced by 75% and now
has p-values ranging from 0.66 to 0.76. These results indicate that the increase in top
executive turnover is not random, rather it is (inversely) correlated with performance: After
controlling for performance, the likelihood that the top executive will depart his position is
greater once a poorly performing fIrm comes into compliance with the key provisions of the
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Code of Best Practice. The answer to the question of whether the "right" managers are
leaving the finns appears to be yes, assuming, of course, that our measures of perfonnance
properly identify the right managers.
So far we have employed an indicator variable to capture the key provisions of the
Code of Best Practice. A further question is - - which of the key provisions is responsible for
the increased sensitivity of turnover to corporate perfonnance? To address that question, we
estimate a final regression with the adopted-Cadbury set of finns in which we include the
fraction of outside directors, an interaction between the fraction of outsiders and our measures
of corporate performance (either IAROA or CER), an indicator variable to identify
observations in which the positions of the Chainnan and CEO are held by a single individual
(1) or by two individuals (0), and an interaction between this indicator variable and our
measures of corporate perfonnance. These variables are designed to capture the changes
brought about by the Code of Best Practice. Because, as we show in Table I, adoption of the
Code led to a general increase in board size, we also include the number of directors and an
interaction between the number of directors and our measure of perfonnance. These
regressions, which also include a performance measure, Dum-for-Adopt, and the four control
variables, are shown as the fifth regression in each panel.
According to the regressions, when the board composition and ChainnanlCEO
variables are included, the coefficients of the interaction of the Dum-for-Adopt and our
measures of performance are not significant (p-values range from 0.59 to 0.96). Additionally,
the coefficient of the fraction of outsiders on the board is positive, albeit not significant, in
each regression (p-values range from 0.27 to 0.38). More interestingly, the coefficients of the
interaction between the fraction of outsiders and our measures of perfonnance are always
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negative with p-values that range from 0.07 to 0.10. In contrast, in none of the regressions
does the coefficients of the dummy for the CEO/chairman or the coefficient of the interaction
of this variable with our measures of performance begin to approach statistical significance
(p-values range from 0.88 to 0.94).
Apparently, the increased sensitivity of turnover to corporate performance for the
adopted-Cadbury set (and the contemporaneous loss in significance of the interaction of
Dum-for-Adopt with performance) is attributable to the increase in the fraction of outside
directors. Splitting the responsibilities of the Chairman and CEO between two individuals
appears to have no effect on the rate of turnover in the top executive.
Two further observations are worth making. The coefficient of board size is always
negative, which indicates that turnover is less likely, the larger the board; however, with p-
values that range from 0.20 to 0.37, this variable is not significant at traditionally accepted
levels. The more interesting variable is the interaction of board size with our measures of
performance. The coefficients of this variable are also always negative and have p-values that
range from 0.07 to 0.10. Thus, the sensitivity of turnover to performance is lower the larger
the board. Or to put it slightly differently, firms with smaller boards show more sensitivity to
performance (in terms of turnover in the top executive) than do firms with larger boards.
The regressions reported in Tables IV and V for turnover in the top executive are also
estimated for turnover in the top management team excluding the top executive. The signs of
the coefficients for these regressions (not shown in a table) are identical to those of Tables IV
and V, however, the p-values of the variables are not significant at traditional levels. For
example, the sign of the Cadbury 1993-96 dummy variable is positive with p-values that
range from 0.16 to 0.20. Similarly, the sign on the Dum-for-Adopt variable is also positive in
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each regression, but has p-values that range from 0.17 to 0.24. The coefficient for the
interaction of Dum-for-Adopt and our measures of performance in the same regression is
always negative with p-values that range from 0.15 to 0.26.8 In short, the regressions for
turnover in the top management team excluding the top executive are consistent with those of
turnover in the top executive, but the levels of statistical significance are much weaker.
V. Commentary and Conclusions
As we noted at the outset, we view this study as making contributions in the small and
the large of corporate governance and of the connection between management turnover and
corporate performance. From a narrow perspective, we have analyzed in detail the effect of
the Cadbury Committee's key recommendations on the structure of UK boards of directors
and on the impact of these recommendations on the connection between top management
turnover and corporate performance. We document a general increase in the size of corporate
boards, an increase in the fraction of outside directors, and an increase in the number of firms
in which the positions of CEO and chairman are held by two different individuals following
publication of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations in December 1992. We also
document an increase in the rate of top management turnover following publication of the
Cadbury Report and that this increase is concentrated among firms that came into compliance
with the key provisions of the Code of Best Practice during the period of our study. We
further document a significant (negative) correlation between top management turnover and
corporate performance both before and after the Cadbury Report: the poorer the performance,
the higher the rate of turnover. Among firms that came into compliance with the Code during
8 The results of these regressions are available from the authors upon request.
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the period of our study, we find an increase in the correlation of turnover to corporate
performance following their adoption of the Code. Finally, this increase in the sensitivity of
turnover to performance appears to be due to the increase in the fraction of outside directors,
rather than splitting the responsibilities of the CEO and chairman between two individuals.
Thus, when we refer to our findings as contributing to the small of corporate
governance, we mean to say that our study examines the link between management turnover,
corporate performance, and board structure in the specific context of the issuance and the
implementation of the Cadbury Report. We do not mean to minimize the importance of our
findings to the firms and investors involved nor to the global economy, after all the Code
applies to all publicly-traded UK companies and the UK's GNP ranks 7th among all nations.
From a broader perspective, we mean to say that our results are likely to have
implications beyond the confines of the Cadbury Report and add to the broader literature on
management turnover, corporate performance, corporate governance and board structure.
Prior studies on the relationship between top management turnover and corporate
performance include Coughlan and Schmidt (1985), Franks and Mayer (1995), Gilson (1989),
Huson, Parrino and Starks (1998), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Kang and Shivdasani (1995)
and Kaplan (1994a, b), Martin and McConnell (1991), Mikkelson and Partch (1997), Morek,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Murphy and Zimmerman (1993), Warner, Watts and Wruck
(1988) and Weisbach (1988). These studies cover various time periods beginning in 1962 and
encompass Japan, the US, and the UK. Each of these studies reports a negative and
significant correlation between top management turnover and at least one measure of
corporate performance, either accounting profitability or stock returns. Our results
complement those of earlier studies and add to them in that we document a negative and
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significant correlation between top management turnover and corporate performance and we
document an increase in the sensitivity of turnover to performance following publication of
the Cadbury Report and the adoption of the Code of Best Practice by UK companies.
Our study also complements and adds to the literature on board composition and
corporate performance. Bhagat and Black (1998) dichotomize research on this topic into two
categories: (1) studies of whether board composition determines the way in which boards
accomplish discrete tasks, such as hiring and firing top management,' responding to hostile
takeovers, setting CEO compensation, and so forth and (2) studies of how board composition
influences the firm's overall profitability. Our study fits the former category.
Prior studies of board composition and management turnover provide mixed results.
Weisbach (1988) studies 367 publicly-traded non-financial US companies over the period
1974 through 1983. He determines that CEO turnover is more highly negatively correlated
with performance (measured with both accounting earnings and stock returns) in firms with
outsider dominated boards. Kang and Shivdasani (1995) examine 270 publicly-traded non-
fmancial Japanese companies over the period 1985 through 1990. Contrary to Weisbach, they
find that the sensitivity of turnover to performance is unrelated to the fraction of outside
directors.9
Our results are consistent with Weisbach in that we determine that, among poorly
performing firms, top management turnover increases as the fraction of outside board
members increases. Like Weisbach, our results are contrary to those of Kang and Shivdasani
and that difference may very well be attributable to cross-country differences in the role of
9 Mikkelson and Partch (1997) examine 200 publicly-traded US companies over the period 1984 through 1993.
They find no relationship between the probability of management turnover and the fraction of outside directors
on the board. However, they do not examine the sensitivity of the relationship between turnover and
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boards and outside directors. If so, the US and the UK apparently are more similar to each
other on this dimension than is either one to Japan.
As we noted, our study fits into the first category of research identified by Bhagat and
Black (1998). Having examined the impact of the Cadbury Committee's recommendations on
one specific board task, in a subsequent study, we intend to tum our attention to the second
category by examining the effect of the Committee's recommendations on overall corporate
performance.
perfonnance to the fraction of outside directors. Thus their study and ours are not directly comparable.
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Table I
Financial, Ownership, and Board Characteristics of UK Companies over 1989 through 1996
Descriptive statistics for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK finns over the period 1989-19%. The sample finns are classified into 3 sets based on whether they were (a)
Always-in-Compliance, (b) Adopted-Cadbury recommendations and (c) Never-in-Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample finns in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year
periods, pre- and post-publication of the Cadbury Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to 1996). Sample finns in (b) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre- and post-adoption of the Cadbury
recommendations (y-4 to y-I and y+l to y+4). The sample consists of industrial companies included in the Stock Exchange Yearbook and in the Corporate Register and listed on the London
Stock Exchange. Finns that leave the sample between 1989-96 are replaced by finns entering the London Stock Exchange on the date closest to departure. Management and board characteristics




Years Mean (Median) Years Mean (Median) Years Mean (Median) Years Mean (Median)
Panel A: Financial Characteristics
N=460 N= 150 N=288 N=22
Market Value of Equity 1989-92 523.4" (255.96)" 1989-92 539.2" (256.74)" y-4 to y-I 521.9" (255.61)" 1989-92 511.4 (254.11)
(£ million) 1993-96 717.2 (272.94) 1993-96 704.4 (269.32) y+l to y+4 722.6 (273.91) 1993-96 579.3 (258.86)
Book Value of Assets 1989-92 149.2' (50.8) 1989-92 148.8' (48.8) y-4 to y-l 150.1' (50.7) 1989-92 146.8 (45.3)
(£ million) 1993-96 156.8 (56.7) 1993-96 155.6 (53.2) y+l to y+4 158.6 (58.7) 1993-96 150.7 (49.2)
Liabilities!Assets 1989-92 0.501 (0.505) 1989-92 0.502 (0.493) y-4 to y-l 0.500 (0.509) 1989-92 0.579 (0.582)
1993-96 0.509 (0.562) 1993-96 0.519 (0.538) y+l to y+4 0.503 (0.498) 1993-96 0.603 (0.597)
Panel B: Share Ownership
Top Executive 1989-92 1.08 (1.01) 1989-92 1.07 (0.98) y-4 to y-I 1.11 '(1.05) 1989-92 5.37 (4.30)
Ownership of Shares (0%) 1993-96 1.04 (1.05) 1993-96 1.01 (0.99) y+l to y+4 1.10 (1.08) 1993-96 3.89 (3.29)
Board Ownership 1989-92 2.23 (2.39) 1989-92 2.22 (2.23) y-4 to y-l 2.23 (2.44) 1989-92 9.93 (10.11)
of Shares (0%) 1993-96 2.24 (2.34) 1993-96 2.09 (1.96) y+l to y+4 2.25 (2.43) 1993-96 8.34 (9.27)
Institutional 1989-92 10.70 (10.96) 1989-92 12.83 (12.60) y-4 to y-l 9.79 (9.99) 1989-92 6.45 (5.93)
Ownership (0%) 1993-96 11.35 (10.83) 1993-96 13.32 (13.01) y+l to y+4 11.09 (10.44) 1993-96 6.09 (5.99)
Number of 1989-92 2 (2) 1989-92 3 (2.04) y-4 to y-l 2' (2)' 1989-92 1 (I)
Blockholders 1993-96 3 (3) 1993-96 3 (3.05) y+l to y+4 3 (3) 1993-96 1 (I)
I .' . .
Table I - - continued
Panel C: Board Characteristics
Percent with 1989-92 36.49· 1989-92 0.00 y-4 to y-l 39.07·' 1989-92 42.17
Single Individual as 1993-96 15.43 1993-96 0.00 y+l to y+4 0.00 1993-96 35.21
Chairman & CEO
Board Size 1989-92 5.71 (5.00)' 1989-92 6.69 (6.00) y-4 to y-l 5.49· (5.00)" 1989-92 4.53 (4.00)
1993-96 7.29 (7.00) 1993-96 7.41 (7.00) y+l to y+4 7.13 (7.00) 1993-96 5.02 (5.00)
Percentage of 1989-92 35.3'· (36.9)"· 1989-92 48.6 (43.4) y-4 to y-l 26.1·' (25.7)"' 1989-92 17.9 (15.4)
Outside Directors 1993-96 46.0 (43.1) 1993-96 48.5 (45.8) y+l to y+4 46.6 (40.6) 1993-96 21.5 (20.9)
..
and· denotes significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively.
Table n
Incidence and Rates of Top Management Turnover in UK Companies, 1989 through 1996
Top management turnover for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK firms over the period 1989 through 1996. The sample firms are classified into 3 sets
based on whether they were (a) Always-in-Compliance, (b) Adopted-Cadbury recommendations, and (c) Never-in-Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample
firms in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre- and post-publication of the Cadbury Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to 1996). Sample firms in (b) are analyzed
over two 4-year periods, pre- and post-adoption of the Cadbury recommendations (y-4 to y-l and y+l to y+4). For each firm, top management names in the Corporate
Register are compared from 1988 through 1996 to determine top management turnover. Turnover is classified as normal or routine by examining news articles in the atel
Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macarthy's News Information Service.
SamDle Firms Always-in-Compliance AdoDted-Cadburv Never-in-Compliance
Panel A: Rates of Turnover in the Top Executive
Years Incidence Rate Years Incidence Rate Years Incidence Rate Years Incidence Rate
N=460 N= 150 N=288 N=22
All Turnover 1989-92 119" 0.065" 1989-92 35 0.054 y-4 to y-I 80"" 0.012"" 1989-92 4 0.046
1993-96 138 0.071 1993-96 37 0.058 y+l to y+4 98 0.089 1993-96 3 0.034
Forced Turnover 1989-92 57" 0.031" 1989-92 24 0.038 y-4 to y-l 30"" 0.027"" 1989-92 3 0.033
1993-96 79 0.043 1993-96 20 0.031 y+l to y+4 58 0.050 1993-96 1 0.011
Panel B: Rates of Turnover in the Top Management Team excluding the Top Executive
All Turnover 1989-92 77 0.042 1989-92 21 0.033 y-4 to y-l 48" 0.043" 1989-92 8 0.091
1993-96 90 0.049 1993-96 22 0.034 y+l to y+4 62 0.056 1993-96 6 0.068
Forced Turnover 1989-92 48" 0.026" 1989-92 6" 0.094" y-4 to y-I 37 0.033 1989-92 5 0.054
1993-96 66 0.036 1993-96 16 0.025 y+l to y+4 47 0.043 1993-96 3 0.033
.. and • denotes significance at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively.
TableID
Top Executive Turnover in UK Finns Grouped by Quartiles of Performance over 1989 through 1996
Top management turnover for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK firms grouped into quartiles based on performance measures in the two four-year periods during the
interval 1989 to 1996. lAROA is calculated as earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by the total book value of assets less the median performance of firms in the same Financial
Times industriaJ grouping. Three years of lAROA are averaged. CERs are cumulative market model excess returns computed using daily returns beginning 36 calendar months prior to, and
ending 2 days prior to the announcement of the top executive change. Top executive turnover is any change in the CEO. Turnover is classified as normal or routine by examining news articles in
the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macanhy's News Infonnation Service. The sample firms are classified into 3 sets based on whether they were (a) Always-in-
Compliance, (b) Adopted-Cadbury recommendations and (c) Never-in-Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample firms in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre-
and post-publication of the Cadbury Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to 1996). Sample firms in (b) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre- and post-adoption of the Cadbury recommendations (y-
4 to y-I and y+1 to y+4).
Interval Quartile 1
(Lowest performance)
Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
(Highest performance)
Panel A: Top Executive Turnover by Quartiles of Industry- and Size-adjusted IARQA
Years Incidence Rate Incidence Rate Incidence Rate Incidence Rate
All sample firms 1989-1992 49 0.107" 33 0.072 24 0.052 13 0.028
1993-1996 66 0.143 41 0.089 21 0.046 10 0.022
(a) Always in compliance 1989-1992 21 0.140 10 0.067 3 0.020 1 0.007
1993-1996 20 0.133 10 0.067 6 0.040 1 0.007
(b) Adopted compliance y-4 to y-l 26 0.090" 22 0.076" 20 0.069 12 0.042
y+l to y+4 45 0.156 30 0.104 14 0.049 9 0.031
(c) Never in compliance 1989-1992 2 0.091 I 0.045 I 0.045 0 0.000
1993-1996 I 0.045 1 0.045 I 0.045 0 0.000
Panel B: Forced Top Executive Turnover by Quartiles of Industry- and Size-adjusted IARQA
All sample firms 1989-1992 33 0.072" 15 0.033 9 0.020 0 0.000
1993-1996 47 0.102 25 0.054 7 0.Ql5 0 0.000
(a) Always in compliance 1989-1992 15 0.100 6 0.040 3 0.020 0 0.000
1993-1996 15 0.100 5 0.033 0 0.000 0 0.000
(b) Adopted compliance y-4 to y-I 16 0.055" 8 0.023' 6 0.021 0 0.000
y+1 to y+4 31 0.108 20 0.069 7 0.028 0 0.000
(c) Never in compliance 1989-1992 2 0.091 I 0.045 0 0.000 0 0.000
1993-1996 1 0.045 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
Table In - - continued
Panel C: Top Executive Turnover by Quartiles of CERs
All sample finns 1989-1992 63 0.137· 34 0.074 11 0.024 II 0.024
1993-1996 72 0.157 42 0.091 12 0.026 12 0.026
(a) Always in compliance 1989-1992 23 0.153 10 0.067 I 0.007 1 0.007
1993-1996 25 0.167 5 0.033 4 0.027 3 0.021
(b) Adopted compliance y-4toy-1 38 0.132 23 0.080· 10 0.035 9 0.031
y+l to y+4 45 0.156 36 0.125 8 0.028 9 0.031
(c) Never in compliance 1989-1992 2 0.091 I 0.045 0 0.000 1 0.045
1993-1996 2 0.091 1 0.045 0 0.000 0 0.000
Panel D: Forced Top Executive Turnover by Quartiles of CERs
All sample firms 1989-1992 38 0.083· 17 0.037* 2 0.004 0 0.000
1993-1996 50 0.109 29 0.063 0 0.000 0 0.000
(a) Always in compliance 1989-1992 18 0.120 6 0.040 0 0.000 0 0.000
1993-1996 18 0.120 3 0.020 0 0.000 0 0.000
(b) Adopted compliance y-4to y-l 18 0.063· 10 0.035* 2 0.007 0 0.000
y+l to y+4 31 0.108 26 0.090 0 0.000 0 0.000
(c) Never in compliance 1989-1992 2 0.091 1 0.045 0 0.000 0 0.000
1993-1996 1 0.045 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000
.. and • denotes significance at lhe om and 0.05 levels respectively.
Table IV
Logit Regressions of Top Management Turnover on IAROA and Cadbury Report Compliance, 1989 through 1996
Results of logit regressions of top management turnover for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK firms in two four-year periods during the interval 1989 to 1996. IAROA is
calculated as earnings before interest, tax and depreciation divided by the total book value of assets less the median performance of firms in the same Financial Times industrial grouping. Three
years of IAROA are averaged. Top executive turnover is any change in the CEO. Turnover is classified as normal or routine by examining news articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries,
the Financial Times and Macarthy's News Information Service. The sample firms are classified into 3 sets based on whether they were (a) Always-in-Compliance. (b) Adopted-Cadbury
recommendations and (c) Never-in-Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample firms in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre- and post-publication of the Cadbury
Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to 1996). Sample firms in (b) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre- and post-adoption of the Cadbury recommendations (y-4 to y-I and y+l to y+4).
Accounting information and share prices are from Datastream. Dependent variable equals one when turnover occurs. Dum for 1993-96 variable equals one for the period 1993-1996. Dum-for-
Adopt equals one for the period following the adoption of the key recommendations of the Cadbury Report. The interactive dummy is Dum-for-Adopt multiplied by IAROA. P-values are in
parentheses.










Prop non-execs x Perform
Dum Dual CEO
Dum Dual CEO x Perform
Board size









Total Sample Always-in-Compliance Adopted-Cadbury Adopted-Cadbury
(N=460) (N=150) (N=288) (N=288)
-1.866 (0.08) -1.849 (0.09) -2.570 (0.00) -2.799 (0.00)
-2.034 (0.02) -1.859 (0.10) -3.180 (0.00) -3.228 (0.00)
0.457 (0.11) 0.055 (0.92)
0.593 (0.06) 0.148 (0.66)
-0.739 (0.02)
-0.984 (0.04) -1.092 (0.05) -0.812 (0.08) -0.844 (0.09)
1.294 (0.08) 1.027 (0.21) 0.985 (0.28) 1.032 (0.21)
0.039 (0.60) 0.045 (0.48) 0.028 (0.72) 0.031 (0.68)
-0.159 (0.02) -0.122 (0.06) -0.142 (0.05) -0.139 (0.05)
3680 1200 2304 2304
·572.89 -387.66 -454.]] -499.20




















Table IV . - continued
Panel B: Logit Regressions of Forced Top Executive Turnover on IAROA and Cadbury Compliance
Variable Total Sample Always-in-Compliance Adopted-Cadbury Adopted-Cadbury Adopted-Cadbury
(N=460) (N=150) (N=288) (N=288) (N=288)
Intercept -1.745 (0.16) -1.887 (0.10) -2.995 (0.00) -2.819 (0.00) -2.493 (0.00)
Performance Variable:
ROA -2.932 (0.00) -2.293 (0.00) -4.882 (0.00) -4.659 (0.00) -3.921 (0.00)
Dum for 1993-96 0.531 (0.08) 0.151 (0.79)
Dum-for-Adopt 0.631 (0.07) 0.164 (0.61) 0.132 (0.68)
Dum-for-Adopt x Perform -0.659 (0.06) 0.129 (0.68)
Board variables:
Prop of non-execs 0.364 (0.30)
Prop non-execs x Perform -0.618 (0.07)
Dum Dual CEO -0.053 (0.87)
Dum Dual CEO x Perform -0.103 (0.69)
Board size -0.031 (0.25)
Board size x Perform -0.058 (0.08)
Control variables:
Directors Ownership -U90 (0.01) -1.114 (0.05) -0.820 (0.10) -0.854 (0.08) -0.852 (0.08)
Institutional Shareholders 1.260 (0.10) 1.039 (0.22) 1.140 (0.15) 1.176 (0.15) 1.144 (0.15)
Blockholders 0.051 (0.48) 0.076 (0.38) 0.044 (0.46) 0.049 (0.45) 0.043 (0.46)
Assets (In) -0.131 (0.05) -0.129 (0.06) -0.166 (0.04) -0.170 (0.04) -0.189 (0.03)
Observations 3680 1200 2304 2304 2304
Log-likelihood -621.87 -485.07 -569.29 -588.65 -603.03
Chi-square 89.35 (0.00) 53.58 (0.00) 88.66 (0.00) 87.69 (0.00) 88.21 (0.00)
Table V
Logit Regressions of Turnover on CER and Cadbury Report Compliance 1989 through 1996
Results of logit regressions of top management turnover for a random sample of 460 publicly-traded non-financial UK firms in the two four-year periods during the interval 1989 to 1996. CERs
are market model cumulative excess returns computed using daily returns beginning 36 calendar months prior to, and ending 2 days prior to the announcement of the top executive change. Top
executive turnover is any change in the CEO. Turnover is classified as normal or routine by examining news articles in the Extel Weekly News Summaries, the Financial Times and Macarthy's
News Information Service. The sample firms are classified into 3 sets based on whether they were (a) Always-in-Compliance, (b) Adopted-Cadbury recommendations and (c) Never-in-
Compliance with the Cadbury recommendations. Sample firms in (a) and (c) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre- and post-publication of the Cadbury Report (1989-1992 and 1993 to
1996). Sample firms in (b) are analyzed over two 4-year periods, pre- and post-adoption of the Cadbury recommendations (y-4 to y-l and y+l to y+4). Accounting information and share prices
come from Datastream. Dependent variable equals one when turnover occurs. Dum 1993-96 equals one for the period 1993-1996. Dum-far-Adopt equals one for the period following the
adoption of the key recommendations of the Cadbury Report. The interactive dummy is Dum-for-Adopt multiplied by CER. P-values are in parentheses.










Prop non-execs x Perform
Dum Dual CEO
Dum Dual CEO x Perform
Board size









Total Sample Always-in-Compliance Adopted-Cadbury Adopted-Cadbury
(N=460) (N=150) (N=288) (N=288)
-3.857 (0.00) -2.629 (0.00) -2.739 (0.00) -2.695 (0.00)
-0.021 (0.00) -0.010 (0.04) -0.025 (0.00) -0.025 (0.00)
0.512 (0.09) 0.069 (0.87)
0.568 (0.08) 0.104 (0.76)
-0.684 (0.05)
-0.932 (0.04) -1.194 (0.02) -0.810 (0.08) -0.814 (0.08)
1.192 (0.12) 1.059 (0.18) 0.829 (0.37) 0.828 (0.37)
0.059 (0.39) 0.071 (0.29) 0.039 (0.51) 0.031 (0.68)
-0.088 (0.15) -0.128 (0.04) -0.076 (0.17) -0.085 (0.16)
3680 1200 2304 2304
-595.25 -494.65 -521.84 -584.28




















Table V •• continued
Panel B: Logit Regression of Forced Top Executive Turnover on CER and Cadbury Compliance
Variable Total Sample Always-in-Compliance Adopted-Cadbury Adopted-Cadbury Adopted-Cadbury
(N=460) (N=150) (N=288) (N=288) (N=288)
Intercept -4.184 (0.00) -2.938 (0.00) -5.029 (0.00) -5.012 (0.00) -4.667 (0.00)
Performance Variable:
Cumulative Excess Returns (CER) -0.038 (0.00) -0.017 (0.02) -0.057 (0.00) -0.061 (0.00) -0.052 (0.00)
Dum for 1993-96 0.592 (0.04) 0.052 (0.84)
Dum-for-Adopt 0.527 (0.09) 0.217 (0.63) 0.031 (0.92)
Dum-for-Adopt x Perform -0.574 (0.08) -0.129 (0.68)
Board variables:
Prop of non-execs 0.273 (0.39)
Prop non-execs x Perform -0.557 (0.09)
Dum Dual CEO -0.061 (0.83)
Dum Dual CEO x Perform -0.041 (0.92)
Board size -0.039 (0.35)
Board size x Perform -0.046 (0.10)
Control variables:
Directors Ownership -0.949 (0.04) -0.955 (0.05) -0.829 (0.08) -0.844 (0.07) -0.771 (0.12)
Institutional Shareholders 1.057 (0.20) 1.106 (0.19) 0.621 (0.60) 0.625 (0.60) 0.560 (0.68)
Blockholders 0.079 (0.25) 0.103 (0.07) 0.045 (0.48) 0.044 (0.47) 0.044 (0.47)
Assets (In) -0.108 (0.08) -0.140 (0.03) -0.041 (0.34) -0.049 (0.32) -0.041 (0.34)
Observations 3680 1200 2304 2304 2304
Log-likelihood -634.59 -548.51 -602.44 -589.02 -618.29
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